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CRIMINAL OBSCENITY STATUTE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
FOR LACK OF SCIENTER
City of Cincinnati v. Marshall
172 Ohio St. 280, 175 N.E2d 178 (1961)
Defendant, a wholesale distributor of periodicals, was convicted for
violating a Cincinnati ordinance making the possession or sale of obscene
writings or pictures a misdemeanor.' Defendant had been out of town dur-
ing the ten days preceding the confiscation of the fourteen magazines upon
which the prosecution based its indictment. The city prevailed in the Cin-
cinnati Municipal Court and the decision was subsequently affirmed by both
the court of common pleas and the Court of Appeals 2 for Hamilton County.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, declaring the ordinance "fatally de-
fective due to its omission of the element of scienter or knowledge in defining
the offense." 3 The Ohio Supreme Court applied the rule enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Smith v. California4 where a Los Angeles
ordinance, similar to the Cincinnati ordinance in that the requirement of
knowledge was lacking, was held to violate the freedom of the press provision
of the United States Constitution.
Attempts to control obscenity by legislation in this country date back to
1 Section 901-i3 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Cincinnati reads:
Whoever shall print, engrave, sell, offer for sale, give away, exhibit or publish, or
exhibit as for sale or other purpose, or have in his possession or under his con-
trol, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or immodest book, pamphlet, paper,
picture, image, cast statuary, drawing or representation, or any other article of an
indecent or immoral nature, or book, paper, print, circular or writing made up
principally of pictures or stories of immodest deeds, lust or crime, or shall exhibit
upon the public street or highway, any of the articles or papers, prints, publica-
tions as aforesaid, within the view of passerby upon said street or highway, shall
be fined not more than $500.00 or imprisoned not more than six months or both
for the first offense and shall be fined not more than $1000.00 or imprisoned
not more than six months or both for the second and subsequent offenses.
2 Lower courts had recognized the lack of scienter requirement under the ordinance.
The judge in the trial court (Cincinnati Municipal Court) had charged the jury in
part: "The intent of the defendant, if you find in fact he did have the materials under
his control, is of no matter in this case. Whether the defendant had a good or an evil
or an unlawful intent is of no concern to you .... The indecent publications ordinance
makes the mere possession of having under his control obscene, lewd, or indecent ma-
terials unlawful, and the intent with which they are possessed or held is of no con-
sequence. The ordinance provides no exception by reason of the existence of any good,
bad, indifferent, or special intent in the possession of the materials."
See also, City of Cincinnati v. Marshall, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 163, 164, 175 N.E.2d 181,
182 (Ct. App. 1960). "It will be noticed that under this ordinance the very possession of
the type of literature described therein is sufficient for such conviction and that no guilty
knowledge is necessary for conviction."
3 City of Cincinnati v. Marshall, 172 Ohio St. 280, 281-2, 175 N.E.2d 178, 179 (1961).
4 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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the pre-revolutionary period.5 In 1868, British courts devised the Hicklin
rule as the test of obscenity; its standard turned on the "tendency of the
matter charged ... to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort
may fall." 6 This test was adopted in the United States in 1879,7 but was
sharply criticized as reflecting "mid-Victorian morals" and because its
standard would "forbid all which might corrupt the most corruptible." S The
Hicklin rule was finally rejected in 1934, and the emphasis was placed on the
challenged work's "dominant effect. ' 9 The standard which is applied today
is the test set out in Roth v. United States:10
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest."
The Ohio Supreme Court in the principal case acknowledged that states
have the power to prevent the distribution of obscene matter,'2 but held that
the Smith case was controlling in that "the mental element may not be
eliminated from the crime of possession or dissemination of obscene matter."' 3
The Marshall decision also adheres to the principle that strict liability penal
laws may be a valid exercise of the police power of a state or municipal
corporation. Although mens rea is accepted as the rule rather than the ex-
ception in criminal law,14 conduct without either criminal knowledge or
intent is often a sufficient basis for criminal liability. There is broad power
vested in the legislature to exclude knowledge, 15 and the development in
Ohio of legislation to regulate a limited class of mala prohibitum statutory
offenses in areas such as illegal sales of liquor, pure food and drugs, mis-
branded merchandise, child labor, narcotics regulation, and motor vehicle
laws without any criminal knowledge or intent has been upheld as a valid
5 Acts & Laws of the Prov. of Mass., Bay, c. CV § 8 (1712).
6 Queen v. Hicklin (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371.
7 United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879).
8 Learned Hand, J., in United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-121 (S.D.N.Y.
1913).
9 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934).
10 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11 Id. at 489. This test was adopted in Ohio in City of Cincinnati v. King, 107
Ohio App. 453, 159 N.E.2d 767 (1958). The test is an adaptation of the definition formu-
lated in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957).
12 Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 481-485.
13 City of Cincinnati v. Marshall, .supra note 3, at 284, 175 N.E.2d at 181.
14 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); State v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio
App. 91, 55 N.E.2d 870 (1944); Holmes, The Common Law, p. 3 (1881); Pound, In-
troduction to Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law (1927); Hall, General Principles of
Criminal Law (1947).
16 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559 (1911); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922); People v.
Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, 123 N.E. 543 (1919); 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 16.
[Vol. 23
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
exercise of the police power to promote the safety, health, and well-being of
the community.16 These statutes emphasize social betterment and higher
standards of conduct rather than the actual punishment or deterrence of
crime; 17 they are a matter of policy designed as controls for the social
order.' 8
However, in defining crimes or declaring their punishment, the legisla-
ture cannot take away or impair any inalienable right secured to citizens by
the Constitution.' 9 The First Amendment liberties lie "at the foundation of
free government by free men" and courts must in all cases "weigh the cir-
cumstances and appraise the reasons in support of the regulation of the
rights.120 Moreover, a legal doctrine which in most instances would be held
valid may be unconstitutional if its collateral effect is to inhibit these
guaranteed freedoms. 21 The effect of the ordinance in the principal case is
to make the individual retail bookseller absolutely responsible for every
publication or periodical which he may sell. He cannot be expected to read
every book which may be available on his shelves;22 yet the regulation im-
poses an extremely high standard of care, and in furtherance of that standard,
subjects him to absolute criminal liability. This is not only an onerous burden
and an unusually rigid requirement of vigilance, but an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the freedoms of speech and press.2 3 The attempt to meet this
responsibility would physically restrict the amount of material which could
be offered by these outlets of communication. The effect is to choke the free
flow of ideas so vital to democratic thought and government. While strict
liability criminal regulation may be justified in the distribution of food due
to the obvious need to protect the public health and the patently harmful
effects on the public interest which adulterated food will produce, the con-
sequences or impact on public morality and conduct which is the direct result
of the distribution of obscene literature is subject to great conjecture.24
16 State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 N.E. 163 (1896); City of Columbus v. Web-
ster, 170 Ohio St. 327, 164 N.E.2d 734 (1960); State v. Morello, 169 Ohio St. 213, 158
N.E.2d 525 (1959); State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951); State v.
Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27, 1 N.E.2d 313 (1936); Kendall v. State, 113 Ohio St. 111, 148
N.E. 367 (1925); Portage Markets Co. v. George, 111 Ohio St. 775, 146 N.E. 283 (1924);
State v. Rippeth, 71 Ohio St. 85, 72 N.E. 298 (1904).
17 United States v. Balint, supra note 15.
1s Morissette v. United States, supra note 14.
19 Smith v. California, supra note 4; Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957);
Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 77 Pac. 924 (1904); 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 16.
20 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
21 Smith v. California, supra note 4, at 150-151.
22 Ibid. But see City of Cincinnati v. King, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 433, 168 N.E.2d 633
(1960).
23 Id. at 152-3: "There is no specific constitutional inhibition against making the
distributors of food the strictest censors of their merchandise, but the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing a
similar requirement on the bookseller."
24 Douglas, J., dissenting in Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 510-11: "It is
by no means clear that obscene literature, as here defined, is a significant factor in in-
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Whether obscene materials are really a cause of juvenile delinquency, an
incitement to anti-social conduct,25 or even a stimulant to undesirable
thoughts and various evils" attributed to them by the defenders of com-
munity censorship laws is a most debatable inference on which there is an
appalling dearth of reliable data. 27 Sociologists, statisticians, law professors,
and reformers all can give forceful and often contradictory arguments28 on
whether obscene literature is any real stimulant to overt anti-social acts which
the law seeks to discourage, prevent or punish. 9 In view of this divided
though highly vocal opinion from authorities with antagonistic views, the
courts have agreed that obscene literature is without redeeming social value
fluencing substantial deviation from the community standards. ... If we were certain
that impurity of sexual thoughts impelled to action, we would be on less dangerous
ground in punishing the distributors of this sex literature .... The absence of dependable
information on the effect of obscene literature on human conduct should make us
w ary. .. .. "
Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 587, 595
(1955). "Although the whole structure of obscenity censorship hinges upon the unproved
assumption that 'obscene' literature is a significant factor in causing sexual deviation
from the community standard, no report can be found of a single effort at genuine
research to test this assumption by singling out as a factor for study the effect of sex
literature upon sexual behavior."
Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) "We . . . reject the com-
mon definition of obscene as that which 'tends to corrupt or debase'. . . . [I]t suggests
that change of character or actual misbehavior follows from contact with obscenity.
Evidence of such consequences is lacking. . . " See also Manfred v. State, 226 Md. 312,
173 A.2d 173 (1961); People v. Richmond News Co. Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 579, 216 N.Y.S.2d
369, 175 N.E.2d 681 (1961).
25 Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 501-2. "It is not irrational, in our present
state of knowledge, to consider that pornography can induce a type of sexual conduct
which a state may deem obnoxious to the moral fabric of society."
26 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 502. "The State can reasonably
draw the inference that over a long period of time the indiscriminate dissemination of
materials, the essential character of which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect
on moral standards."
27 See authorities cited supra note 24.
28 Lockhart & McClure, Literature, "The Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution,"
38 Minn. L. Rev. 295 (1954); Lockhart & McClure op. cit. supra note 24; Lockhart &
McClure, The Developing Constitutional Standard, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5 (1960); McKeon,
Merton, & Gellhorn, The Freedom to Read (1957); Kalven, The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity in The Supreme Court Review-1960, p. 1; St. John-Stevas, Obscenity
and the Law, op. cit. supra note 24.
29 Douglas, J., dissenting in Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 509-514: "Speech
to be punishable must have some relation to action which could be penalized by govern-
ment. . . . Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so
closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable part of it."
People v. Richmond News Co. Inc., supra note 24 at 586, 175 N.E.2d at 685: "The
mere undemonstrated possibility of harm to the community from realistic accounts of




and therefore is not protected by the Constitution. 30 However, censorship
regulations are often treated in a narrow manner 3' in an effort to prevent
encroachment of First Amendment liberties. Since the psychological bases
of such legislation is heatedly disputed and the currently available data on
the subject is meager and often unsubstantiated, 32 our highest court has
warned that "the door barring federal and state intrusion" into the funda-
mental freedoms of speech and press "must be... opened only the slightest
crack necessary... ."3 This restrictive attitude of the United States Supreme
Court has been evident since Butler v. Michigan34 in which a broad, over-
reaching regulation was set aside with the warning that such an attempt was
"to burn the house to roast the pig."3 5 The departure from ordinary mens rea
standards is not justified when the harm to society which the ordinance seeks
to remedy is at best a dubious and indirect result of the cause which is
attacked.
The Ohio Supreme Court has now narrowed the scope of the criminal
law by making knowledge of the nature and contents of obscene materials a
requirement for conviction. The statutes which created criminal sanctions for
possession or sale of obscene materials without scienter were obviously
designed to eliminate the problem of proof of such knowledge which the
prosecutor must now undertake.36 This "practical" method of law enforce-
30 Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 485. "Obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally-protected speech or press." See also Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568,
571-572 (1942).
31 People v. Richmond County News Inc., supra note 24, at 584, 175 N.E.2d at 684.
"The broader the prohibitions we read into our statute, the more unlikely it is that these
prohibitions are reasonably related to the legitimate ends which the legislation seeks to
serve. Thus, the constitutional background of the legislation, the inherent nature of
the subject of regulation, and the available knowledge concerning the possible effects
of such regulation all point to and necessitate a very limited definition of the statutory
prohibition of obscenity.'
32 McKeon, Merton, & Gellhorn, op. cit. supra note 28, at 67. "Those who would
ban books argue that particular books make for juvenile delinquency or crime, induce
violence and sadism, corrupt taste, promote sexual perversion, distort human values,
subvert political loyalties, provoke disrespect for the law, produce demeaning stereotypes
of groups, and, in general, make sin even more attractive than it ordinarily is. When
evidence is put forward in support of these claims, it is at best thin and questionable;
more characteristically, it is entirely absent. This naturally leads one to ask, is all this
really so?"
33 Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 488.
34 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
a5 Section 343 of the Michigan Penal Code made the test of obscenity any publica-
tion "tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending
to the corruption of the morals of youth...." Thus, in the words of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter speaking for the Court, the act "made it an offense . . . to make available for the
general reading public . . . a book that the trial judge found to have a potentially
deleterious influence upon youth. ... We have before us legislation not reasonably re-
stricted to the evil with which it is said to deal."
36 Van Voorhis, J., dissenting in People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 346-348; 214
N.Y.S.2d 363, 366-367, 174 N.E.2d 470, 472-473 (1961).
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ment has been called to a halt with the decision in the instant case. Several
other states have dealt with the lack of scienter in their state statutes in
the two years since Smith, and have "read into" the challenged legislation a
requirement of knowledge in order to give the acts a construction which
would uphold their constitutionality.37 The more forthright solution used
in the instant case seems to be a better solution and more cognizant of the
need for clear language and definitive criminal laws.
The principal case leaves unanswered the question of the degree of
scienter which is required for valid anti-obscenity enactments. Elimination
of the knowledge factor entirely is rejected, but the standard of necessary
mens rea remains vague and indefinite. A major reason for such regulation
in the first place was to alleviate the state's burden of proof when defendants
consistently profess innocent ignorance of the contents of objectionable
material confiscated from their shops. Whether proof of actual knowledge
of specific material, negligence for failure to inspect, constructive notice
from questionable titles or cover designs, or even reckless disregard of con-
tent will constitute sufficient scienter under the word "knowingly" which
now saves these ordinances from unconstitutionality is left open by both the
Marshall and Smith decisions. A possible expediency to insure knowledge
is warning by enforcement officers that specific titles must be removed from
the shelves with subsequent arrests and prosecutions only following such
notice. This method transfers enormous power to local officers, however,
with only limited protection through recourse to the courts. It is censorship
in its most threatening and uncontrolled manifestation and seems clearly
undesirable. Many problems remain unsolved in this turbulent and emo-
tional field, but the developing standard of obscenity and the requirement of
scienter as a part of the offense in these criminal codes are steps forward
in the administration of justice in this very subjective area of the law.
37 Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960); Demetropolis v. Commonwealth, 175
N.E.2d 259 (Mass. 1961); State v. Hudson County News, 35 N.J. 284, 173 A,2d 20
(1961); People v. Finkelstein, supra note 36; State v. Jackson, 356 P.2d 495 (Ore.
1960); but cf. Van Voorhis, J., dissent in People v. Finkelstein, supra note 36.
